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 PREFACE 
 
WHY ANOTHER BOOK ABOUT CYBER SECURITY? 
This is an important question. The world does not need more books that opine 
on the threat caused to the invisible cyber infrastructures that we all depend on by 
hackers and viruses and how we need new software and hardware to spot and 
engage with it. Equally, there should be no market demand for the thoughts of 
academics disconnected from the exigencies of the real world about how we 
should conceptualise threats and systems. We have also read enough from 
consultants using thinly-disguised articles to sell mundane and derivative training 
activities. 
But challenging the very meaning of ‘cyber’ itself and seeking out positive, 
practical and pragmatic ways in which any organization could enhance its security 
against cyber (and cyber-enabled) threats: this is a path of enquiry that is much 
less well-travelled. The contributors to this volume, all with extensive pedigrees 
in the ‘real world’, are passionate about persuading whoever will listen that any 
engagement with ‘cyber’ must recognize it as a socio-technical challenge.  
This book is a provocative manifesto of disruptive thinking about cyber 
security. It presents cutting-edge thinking and professional reflection and is 
designed to be a source of ideas and approaches that can be adopted and adapted 
for application in the real world by those who recognise that conventional ways of 
defining and considering cyber attack are insufficient. 
All of the authors believe that ‘cyber’ must be urgently wrestled back from the 
technologists, cyber security professionals, consultancies and corporate silos that 
have hijacked it (seemingly without any resistance) and rendered the term 
essentially meaningless. The authors write from applied and often unique 
experience in a range of commercial, consulting, state and defence environments. 
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 In planning for, managing against and rehearsing responses to cyber attack – 
businesses and governments alike prepare for an artificially limited version of 
reality. In preparing for conventional understandings of cyber attack – 
organisations are compromised from the outset. Scenarios envisaged are 
predictable, often incomprehensible to the C-suite and non-technical personnel 
and focus on the failure or compromise of critical systems. 
There are, of course, some purely technical cyber-threats (e.g. viruses or a 
hacking campaign directed at specific content). But even in regard to these 
eventualities, organisations neglect the strategic and other consequences of non-
trivial disruption to business processes and novel challenges of a less than benign 
operating environment. In preparing for cyber-technical scenarios, organisations 
neglect to consider how the rest of it functions in conditions where response 
capability maybe overwhelmed, recovery may be impossible or take an indefinite 
and unpredictable amount of time. The organisational response to cyber threats - 
which might turn a businesses’ servers into an inaccessible digital crime scene, 
eviscerate market value, generate massive reputational cost and unpredictable 
consequences - presents a very high bar for success. Business continuity, 
emergency planning, disaster recover, crisis management and other functions – 
carefully prepared in isolation from one another – thrash around searching for 
issues that they can apply traction to.  
Many of the authors of this volume have direct experience of inflicting, 
reporting on and protecting organisations from such effects and also have 
knowledge of taking the challenge to additional levels. Most consultancies, 
academics and ‘experts’ don’t live in the real world, are content with operating in 
the commoditised world of cyber-technical security and don’t have the intellectual 
capacity to understand, engage with or monetize this more challenging reality. 
This book is intended to help organisations improve preparedness for both the 
established world of cyber and the real one. 
Preface 
Improving the resilience of organisations to cyber-technical attack is, of 
course, critical and is difficult. But it would not be enough. Growing dynamic 
immunity to a far broader spectrum of cyber is vital and a source of competitive 
advantage to those that can manage it. Few will. This book is for those that 
recognise the compelling need to see cyber security as always more than a 
technical issue.  
CYBER IS IRREDEEMABLY SOCIO-TECHNICAL 
The collective understanding of the contributors to this volume is that we 
should always and only see cyber as a socio-technical threat. The combination of 
humans and computers (in whatever form) blended to produce shock and surprise 
to corporate and government systems. Consequently, preventative counter-
measures and response structures must leverage socio-technical genius to out-
think, out-prepare and out-manoeuvre adversaries. We think that in considering 
cyber attacks, we have no choice but to think of them as extending across the 
electro-magnetic spectrum; involving either simple or more complex use of 
computing power; drawing on creativity and innovation; perpetrated by smart 
criminals, terrorists, competitors, employees (or accident) and underpinned by 
emerging and novel technology. Computers will be involved – but these could be 
used in unexpected ways, such as: 
 capture of an executive or manager, via cyber-enabled blackmail, in 
criminal behaviour (e.g. the use of a digital ‘honeypot’) 
 insertion of errors in software that a system or platform depends on 
(e.g. an illegal ‘defeat device’ planted in a competitor auto-maker) 
 the crafted email which triggers the organisation into responses which 
undermine value 
 the targeted and subtle hacking of critical Intellectual Property (IP) – 
removing or compromising it 
 the distracting mini-technical event which distracts attention from the 
real exploit 
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 the use of novel attacks that generate cyber from kinetic effects (e.g. 
directed energy weapons) 
 loss of trust and reputation via the targeting of up-stream or down-
stream partners in a supply-chain 
Against these and other threats - organisations need agile, adaptive, decisive 
decision-making, enabled by reliable and rehearsed flows of actionable 
information from sensors that provide early warning and rich insight. Systems and 
structures must act on reflex, hit strategic objectives hard, sustain a response, 
make competitive and sustainable decisions that can be amended on the fly and 
draw on a suite of timely and usable insight from technical, legal and other 
experts. 
THE CHAPTERS 
This book opens with two chapters which explore the philosophical 
dimensions of cyber security – in a genuinely pragmatic manner.  Dr Keith Scott 
starts by setting out, in characteristically challenging and wide-ranging fashion, 
why it is that complete cyber security will always be unachievable. Rather than 
rely on technological or policy solutions (which won’t work), Keith suggests that 
we must come to terms with the cyber domain as an ever-growing threat 
landscape, consider that its inherent anarchy may present defensive and offensive 
benefits and develop strategies for threat mitigation which are cognizant of the 
real character and challenges of the cyber space. 
Dr John Ardis extends on these thoughts by bringing an Information 
Operations (IO) perspective to bear on the characteristics of cyber systems and 
their socio-technical components. By intellectually exceeding what typical 
thinkers on cyber-security consider are the properties of the systems they pretend 
to understand, John sets out a view of systems as difficult to understand but where 
socio-technical understanding is competitively advantageous.  
The next four chapters are the distillation of the experience over many 
decades of practitioners attempting to secure the legal and hardware/software 
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industries as well as a complementary public sector view that protests that 
cleaving to technical security has completely overlooked the critical role of 
human error to cyber security. The final contribution in the section reports on how 
a major IT re-seller helps educate and empower its small and medium-sized 
customers about risk. 
David Wood describes why the global legal industry can be characterized as 
‘low hanging fruit’ to cyber attackers, especially in the small to medium-sized 
business space. The implementation of technical solutions has been compromised, 
its people, behaviours and cultures are easy targets and, despite the assumptions 
that reasonable people might make, the legal industry is the weakest link in the 
chains upon which its clients are dependent. Fortunately, David has some ideas 
about how to improve matters cheaply and effectively. 
That ethos is continued by Graham Palmer, who presents seven practical 
maxims for our information security age. Whilst cyber (and cyber-related) 
security is incredibly important, achieving interest, buy-in and compliance is very 
difficult. Graham’s maxims, culminating in the recognition that cyber is about 
‘brains not boxes’ have enabled him to positively communicate holistic socio-
technical information security ideas with board members, senior executives, IT 
staff and fellow security professionals. They could be used in any organization, 
anywhere. 
Clint Barker turns his attention to the fact that senior management teams 
already hold the means for effective security in the cyber age. After 
demonstrating the mis-use of the term ‘cyber security’, Clint criticizes the alleged 
cyber security professionals for neglecting human error and socio-technical means 
– whilst also showing how solutions can be speedily produced from existing 
human resources.  
Finally in this section, Dr Mils Hills and Louise Atkinson report on some 
good news from the world of the IT re-seller. The company that they analyse 
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specializes in working with small and medium sized businesses, where an ethical 
and sustainable culture means that pre-sales and other functions educate clients on 
their actual risk exposure from hardware and software implementation and advise 
on cost-effective mitigations. They fill an information gap left by government and 
other complicated sources and provide a trusted, trustable and tailored solution. 
The next two chapters detail the properties of socio-technical cyber threats 
that conventional analysts and commentators have yet to explore. Dr Mils Hills 
dives into the ways in which cyber-enabled adversaries could use smart 
techniques to influence or direct the decision-making of individuals and 
bureaucracies. Protection from an enhanced corporate immune system subject to 
frequent, cheap exercises, and with active sensors, needs to be in place to detect 
and destroy the potential for any organization to be prevented from self-
determination. 
Stefanie Hills, Thomas Jackson and Martin Sykora continue the theme of 
the unexpected cyber risk by reporting on emerging findings about the use of terse 
text in social media to achieve potential persuasive effect in target populations. 
Organisations and individuals within them both need to be sensitized to the fact 
that cyber security means being aware that they may be the targets of attempts to 
persuade them to think or do something. Well-crafted terse text can help change 
opinions or make it more likely that links to malicious websites, for example, are 
clicked on.  
Many of the prior contributors mention in passing the need to exercise 
relevant corporate plans for responding to a cyber risk coming to pass – whether 
that is in terms of detecting it before crisis strikes, or when the crisis does strike 
with little or no warning. The next three chapters detail practical and proven ways 
of testing plans at all levels of an organization but including the senior 
management; developing serious games to explore how best to act - for use at the 
middle and senior hierarchical levels and, finally, how teams and individuals 
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should be selected to enable the best possible sustainable and strategically-aligned 
performance under possibly overwhelming levels of stress. 
Nick Simms opens this section by reviewing the reasons why organizations 
should rehearse their cyber resilience plans, although notes that in his experience 
many will not have such plans in any case. Practical and pragmatic advice is 
given for those commissioning or designing such exercises, covering phases such 
as the triggering and usability of plans and considerations as to how exercises are 
conducted, and why.   
Dr Paul Theron presents the results of a great deal of reflection on how best 
to conduct serious games about cyber threat, which can be a highly effective way 
of getting beyond the technology-focus of traditional cyber discussions and raise 
awareness about the wider implications of cyber attack. Paul reviews the various 
approaches which are available, compares their efficiency and concludes by 
describing a way in which serious games can be part of a framework to helpfully 
raise management awareness about cyber threat. 
Finally in this section, Guy Batchelor draws on his experience in preparing 
for and (successfully) swimming the English Channel. His chapter explores how a 
combination of the ethos of his military background combined with a well-chosen 
support team enabled him to deliver strategic main effort. In choosing individuals 
to lead and teams to support cyber and other crisis management mechanisms, the 
events and maintaining delivery of set strategic objectives should be thought of as 
being physically, mentally and emotionally arduous.  
The final two chapters reflect on how socio-technical appreciation can be 
implemented into cyber security functions in order to deliver enhanced risk 
management and insight. Stewart K Betram opens this section, by reclassifying 
system intrusions as ‘threat systems’ such as Stuxnet. An enhanced, fine-grained 
understanding of the operational sophistication of such threat systems - missed by 
a purely technical assessment - is proposed, where the use of approaches which 
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consider the human dimension could have a critical role in future cyber security 
processes. 
The final chapter of the book continues this theme. Arun Warikoo reviews 
the development of technical cyber attack detection technologies, but notes that, 
despite the implementation of these, breaches continue to occur. Arun proposes 
improvements to current techniques for detecting, preventing and responding to 
cyber attack through the use of a qualitative, risk-centred approach. This 
additional layer adds value to the enterprise by providing actionable intelligence, 
categorizes cyber-attacks, prioritizes risks in real-time and automates responses to 
cyber-attacks (wherever possible). 
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